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ABSTRACT: In this paper we use a top-down bottom-up CGE microsimulation model with endogenous 
labour  supply  and  unemployment  to  explore  the  impact  of  scaling  up  infrastructure  spending  in  the 
Philippines. In the current debate on the importance of scaling up infrastructure to stimulate growth, 
some  analysts  raise  concerns  about  potential  negative  macroeconomic  impacts  (Dutch  disease).  This 
study aims to provide some insight into this debate by extending the analysis to include distributional 
analysis.  We  draw  from  the  infrastructure  productivity  literature  to  postulate  positive  productive 
externalities of new infrastructure and from Fay and Yepes (2003) to include operating and maintenance 
costs associated with new infrastructure. We investigate two fiscal tools and foreign aid as mechanisms to 
fund  the  new  infrastructure  and  associated  costs.  The  distributional  analysis  is  performed  with  FGT 
indices  and  growth incidence  curves.  Our  results  reveal that  infrastructure spending  reduces  poverty. 
Foreign aid is shown to be the most equitable funding mechanism, whereas a value added tax provides 
the strongest poverty reduction. 
 






Since  Aschauer  (1989)  and  Munnell  (1990) 
stressed the important role of the public sector in 
funding  infrastructure  to  stimulate  economic 
development, a vast literature has dealt with this 
issue.  Theoretical  models  and  empirical  studies 
have  attempted  to  shed  some  light  on  this 
relationship. Some authors believed that a decline 
in  productivity  would  be  induced  by  slow 
expansion  of  public  infrastructure  investment 
(Bergman and Suan 1996; and Binder and Smith 
1997). In policy circles, the role of infrastructure 
was  somewhat  neglected  in  the  context  of  the 
stabilization  and  structural  adjustment  programs 
of  the  mid-eighties  and  nineties.  For  many 
international institutions and developing countries 
the  focus  was  directed  at  liberalizing  trade, 
improving  macroeconomic  balances  and  reacting 
to various external shocks. With improvements in 
these  areas  yet  sluggish  results  in  terms  of 
poverty  reduction  in  many  countries,  the  end  of 
the  nineties  saw  major  changes  in  development 
strategies  by  international  financial  institutions 
(IFI),  development  partners  and  governments  of 
developing countries.  
 
According  to  Estache  (2007),  infrastructure 
appears to be returning to the research agenda of 
development economists. This reflects a change in 
priorities of developing country governments, IFIs 
and  multi-  and  bilateral  donor  agencies  bringing 
infrastructure  back  to  the  top  of  the  policy 
agenda. The Asian Development Bank organized a 
major  conference  entitled  “Infrastructure 
Development:  Private  Solutions  for  the  Poor”  in 
October 2002 in Manila. This conference dealt with 
issues such as making infrastructure projects pro-
poor,  increasing  private  sector  participation  to 
scale  up  infrastructure  and  strengthening  and 
increasing  pro-poor  public-private  infrastructure 
partnerships.  It  built  on  a  May  2000  conference 
organized  by  the  Department  for  International 
Development (DFID-UK) and the World Bank. The 
World Bank‟s world development report published 
in  2001  is  another  important  illustration  of  this 
change,  as  is  the  implementation  in  many 
developing  countries  of  Poverty  Reduction 
Strategy  Programs  (PRSPs).  More  recently  the 
Asian  Development  Bank  (2009)  published  a 
report on investing in sustainable infrastructure to 
improve  lives.  Since  the  turn  of  the  century, 
poverty has been at the centre of all development 
strategies. In many developing countries, growth 
is  constrained  by  infrastructure  bottlenecks  and 
this  is  reflected  in  many  investment  climate 




Recently,  governments  of  developing  countries 
and  various  development  partners  have  been 
investigating the determinants of poverty and the 
most  effective  roads  out  of  poverty.  One 
important determinant that has been identified is 
improvements  in  productivity.  Education  has 
received  great  attention  as  a  tool  to  improve 
labour  productivity.  As  a  result,  significant 
investments have been made, and major reforms 
have been implemented, to improve education in 
developing countries. At the same time, more and 
more  analysts  have  raised  the  issue  of 
deteriorated  or  obsolete  infrastructure  in 
developing  countries  as  a  stumbling  block  for 
growth. In many countries, infrastructure growth 
has not kept up with economic and demographic 
growth and in some instances infrastructure  was 
not even maintained. This situation has led many 
analysts  to  return  to  the  literature  linking  public 
expenditure to infrastructure. These stakeholders 
have  argued  that  major investments  to  scale  up 
infrastructure  levels  would  transform  their  role 
from  a  constraint  to  an  engine  of  growth  that 
would contribute indirectly to poverty reduction in 
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At  the  same  time,  some  researchers,  such  as  
Gupta et al. (2006), Foster and Killick (2006) and 
Mckinley (2005), have suggested that scaling up 
aid  could  have  negative  macroeconomic 
consequences,  notably  through  Dutch  disease 
(i.e., in which foreign inflows contribute to a real 
exchange rate appreciation that adversely affects 
a  country‟s  international competitiveness).  These 
conclusions  have  been  challenged  by  others  in 
empirical  studies  such  as  Berg  et  al.  (2007)  for 
five  Sub-Saharan  African  countries,  Li  and  Rowe 
(2007)  for  Tanzania  and  Mongardini  and  Rayner 
(2009)  for  a  panel  of  28  Sub-Saharan  African 
countries.  Many  researchers  have  also 
investigated the impacts or challenges of scaling 
up  aid  to  achieve  the  Millennium  Development 
Goals (MDG), notably Bourguignon and Sundberg 
(2006) and Hailu (2007). Although the debate has 
not been settled, concern for risks associated with 
a  large  scaling  up  of  aid  (for  infrastructure  or 
other expenditures) continues to prevail in many 
policy circles.  
 
Others  argue  that  significant  infrastructure 
spending  may  result  in  inflation  and  a  resulting 
loss of competitiveness. There is also an important 
body  of  literature  dealing  with  the  crowding-out 
effects of public investment. Finally, some authors 
have raised concerns over the excessive operation 
and maintenance (O&M) cost burden of increased 
public infrastructure.  
 
In  a  recent  comprehensive  report  sponsored 
jointly  by  the  African  Development  Bank,  the 
World  Bank  and  the  Agence  Française  pour  le 
Développement,  edited  by  Foster  and  Briceño-
Garmendia  (2010),  it  was  found  that  half  of 
Africa‟s  growth  was  generated  by  infrastructure. 
In  the  report,  the  authors  argue  that  improved 
infrastructure  will  accelerate  urbanization,  which 
has been the engine for growth in many countries, 
and  will  also  improve  regional  integration.  They 
focus on the potential contribution to the growth 
of  various  forms  of  infrastructure  such  as 
information  and  communication  technologies, 
electricity,  transportation  (in  a  broad  sense), 
water,  irrigation  and  sanitation.  They  further 
decompose  the  respective  contributions  of 
investments in roads, railway, ports and airports. 
The  report  also  investigates  the  impact  on 
poverty,  the  role  of  institutions  and  the  various 
options  available.  The  main  contribution  of  this 
report is to provide an estimate of infrastructure 
spending  in  Africa  needed  to  achieve  optimal 
growth  rates.  This  price  tag  is  estimated  at  93 
billion per year, of which one third is required for 
O&M. 
 
In this paper we provide a comparative analysis of 
funding  mechanisms  to  finance  infrastructure 
investment  and  associated  O&M  costs.  We  build 
on work by Adam and Bevan (2006), Levy (2007) 
and  Estache  et  al.  (2007),  who  explore  how 
infrastructure investments funded through foreign 
aid can contribute to Dutch disease. In their 2006 
paper, Adam and Bevan show that the impact of 
Dutch  disease  can  be  attenuated  if  non-tradable 
sectors also benefit from infrastructure investment 
externalities. They construct an aggregate model 
and apply it to Uganda to verify this. We extend 
this  idea  by  dropping  the  dichotomous 
classification  of  sectors  as  tradable  and  non-
tradable. We also introduce an additional element 
by  imposing  increases  in  public  expenditure  to 
maintain and repair the new public infrastructure 
as in Estache et al. (2007). We investigate fiscal 
policy  and  foreign  aid  as  possible  funding 
mechanisms. We further extend previous work by 
introducing  distributional  analysis  with  poverty 
indices  and  growth  incidence  curves.  For  this 
purpose,  we  adopt  a  top-down/bottom-up  CGE 
microsimulation approach.   
 
The paper is structured as follows: we present the 
CGE top-down/bottom approach in the context of 
CGE  microsimulation  approaches,  then  set  forth 
our model and resolution strategy and present our 
simulations, followed by an examination of macro 
and distributional analysis. We end the paper with 
our concluding remarks and possible extensions.  
 
 
CGE MICROSIMULATION APPROACHES 
 
Three main approaches have been used to study 
the  impacts  of  macro  reforms  on  income 
distribution  and  poverty.  The  first  and  most 
commonly  used  one  is  the  representative 
household approach (CGE-RH), the second is the 
top-down,  layered  or  microsimulation  sequential 
approach  (CGE-MSS),  and  the  third  is  usually 
referred to as the CGE integrated multi-household 
(CGE-IMH)  (see  Davies  (2009)  for  a  detailed 
description of these approaches). 
  
Without  going  into  a  complete  review  of  these 
approaches,  we  wish  to  highlight  a  few  of  their 
drawbacks in order to situate the contribution of 
the Top-down/bottom-up approach. First, despite 
extensive applications for distributive analysis, the 
CGE-RH  has  been  strongly  criticized  for  its 
inability  to  capture  intra  group  changes  in 
distribution  (see  Savard  (2005)  and  Robilliard  et 
al. (2008) for an elaboration of this critique). The 
main drawback of the CGE-MSS approach is that it 
does  not  fully  take  into  account  the  feedback 
effects to the CGE model of household behaviour 
in the microsimulation model. In fact, when micro-
household  behaviour  aggregates  perfectly,  this 
approach implicitly integrates the feedback effect. 
However,  when  household  behaviour  does  not 
aggregate perfectly, the aggregation error is lost 
in  the  process.
2  The  interesting  question  is  to 
know  the  size  of  this  aggregation  error.  If  the 
aggregation  error  is  small,  not  taking  it  into 
account is unlikely to bias results, but this is not 
the  case  if  the  error  is  relatively  large.  This 
critique  of  the  CGE-MSS  approach  has  been 
highlighted  in  two  literature  reviews  of  macro-
micro  modelling  for  poverty  analysis  (Hertel  and 
Reimer  (2005)  and  Bourguignon  and  Spadaro 
(2006)).  The  third  approach  is  the  CGE-IMH, 
which  is  theoretically  sound  but  presents  a  few 
challenges.  First,  it  requires  significant  data SAVARD     Scaling up infrastructure spending in the Philippines        45 
treatment to balance out each household account 
and  reconcile  micro-household  data  with  the 
national  account  data  of  the  SAM.  Also,  large 
models with complex non linear functions can lead 
to  convergence  problems.  These  problems  are 
raised  in  Rutherford  et  al.  (2005),  Chen  and 
Ravallion  (2004)  and  Bourguignon  and  Savard 
(2008). 
 
To circumvent these problems, we apply a more 
flexible  variant  of  the  CGE-IMH  that  draws  from 
the CGE-MSS approach. The basic idea is to push 
the CGE-MSS approach further by explicitly taking 
into  account  the  feedback  effect  of  the 
microsimulation model. This makes it possible to 
take  into  account  the  aggregation  error  of  the 
micro-household  model  in  the  CGE  model.  We 
refer to this approach as the “Top-down/bottom-
up”  (CGE-TD/BU)  approach.  The  approach 
provides greater flexibility for modelling household 
behaviour compared to the CGE-IMH approach by 
introducing a bi-directional link between the CGE 
and  microsimulation  models  to  obtain  a 
convergent  solution.  The  main  drawback  of  the 
approach  is  that  convergence  is  not  guaranteed 
and  must  be  verified  for  each  simulation.  The 
approach  allows  the  modeller  to  use  the  exact 
income  and  expenditure  structure  found  in  the 
household income and expenditure surveys, since 
perfect coherence between micro and macro data 
is not required. Another advantage is that there is 
no limit to the level of disaggregation in terms of 
production sectors and the number of households 
to  be  included  in  the  model.  Finally,  and  most 
importantly, the degree of freedom in choices of 
functional  forms  used  to  reflect  the  micro-
economic heterogeneity of household behaviour is 
as great as in the CGE-MSS approach.  
 
The basic idea of the approach is to use the CGE 
model to generate a price vector (including wage 
rates),  and  a  household  microsimulation  (HHMS) 
model  to  capture  household  behaviour 
(consumption  and  labour  supply)  in  response  to 
these  price  changes.  These  micro-household 
responses are re-aggregated and fed back into the 
CGE model and so on until there is convergence. 
We  will  detail  the  procedure  in  the  subsequent 
section.   
 
 
THE MODEL  
 
The  basic  model  used  for  the  analysis  and  the 
algorithm used for its resolution are presented in 
detail  in  Bourguignon  and  Savard  (2008).  We 
provide a summary of the model hypotheses and 
modifications required to capture the productivity 
of  scaling  up  infrastructure  investment  and  the 
O&M  costs  of  the  new  infrastructure,  which  is 
adapted from Estache et al. (2007). We start with 
the  CGE  model,  which  we  present  in  general 
before  focusing  on  the  special  features  of  the 
infrastructure  application.  We  follow  with  a 
description  of  the  microsimulation  model  and 
complete the presentation with an examination of 
the resolution process.  
The CGE model 
The  CGE  model  is  disaggregated  into  20  sectors 
and  comprises  873  equations.  Production  is 
determined  through  a  3-tier  system:  the  total 
production  of  the  branch  (XS)  is  made  up  of  a 
fixed  share  between  value-added  (VA)  and 
intermediate  consumptions  (CI).  VA  is  a 
combination of composite labour (LD) and capital 
(KD),  which  are  related  with  a  Cobb-Douglas 
function.  Producers  minimize  their  cost  of 
producing  VA  subject  to  the  Cobb-Douglas 
function.  We  introduce  an  infrastructure 
externality parameter into this function, which we 
describe  in  more  detail  below.  Optimal  labour 
demand equations are derived from this process. 
Labour  is  decomposed  into  formal  and  informal 
labour,  and  the  choice  of  combinations  between 
these  two  factors  is  determined  by  a  constant 
elasticity  of  substitution  (CES)  function.
3  We 
assume that capital is not mobile between sectors, 
as it is quite difficult in the short to medium term 
to  convert  capital  in  order  for  it  to  be  used  in 
another  production  sector.  Intermediate 
consumptions  are  determined  by  a  fixed  share 
(Leontief) assumption. 
  
The labour market is quite original with respect to 
most macro/micro models. Our dual labour market 
is  not  perfectly  segmented.  The  nominal  wage 
rate in the formal market is exogenous and it is 
also above the equilibrium market wage;
4 hence, 
we  have  an  excess  supply  of  labour  on  this 
market.  Workers  choose  to  offer  their  labour  on 
the  formal  and  informal  markets  or  stay 
unemployed based on their reservation wage and 
on  the  prevailing  wages  on  the  two  labour 
markets.  The  informal  nominal  wage  rate  is 
flexible and clears this market. The labour market 
mechanisms implemented are found in the  CGE-
RH  modelling  context  in  Fortin  et  al.  (1997), 
Savard  and  Adjovi  (1998),  Devarajan  et  al. 
(1999),  Agénor  et  al.  (2003)  and  Stifel  and 
Thorbecke  (2003),  among  others.  Figure  1 
provides  a  graphic  representation  of  the  labour 
market (similar to the model presented in Thomas 
and Vallée (1996)). 
 
On the left hand side we have the informal sector 
wage and on the right hand side, the formal sector 
wage. The total labour available in the economy is 
measured by the distance 0
i-0
f.  Moving from 0
i to 
0
f we have the supply of  labour on the informal 
market (Lsi) and from point 0
f towards 0
i we have 
the labour supply on the formal market (Lsf). On 
the left hand side we have the aggregate  labour 
demand  of  the  informal  sector  depicted  by  (Ldi) 
and on the right hand side, the aggregate labour 
demand in the formal sector (Ldf). The exogenous 
formal  wage  is  w
1,  and  w
1*  represents  the 
equilibrium  wage  on  the  formal  market  if  the 
nominal wage was not fixed. Employment in the 
formal sector is measured by the distance 0
f - e. 
When w
1 > w
1* we have rationing on this market. 
The  workers  rationed  out  are  not  forced  into 
unemployment as they can decide to supply their 
labour  on  the  informal  sector  market  if  their 
reservation   wage   is   inferior   to   the   nominal SAVARD     Scaling up infrastructure spending in the Philippines        46 
    
 
Figure 1  Labour market representation 
 
 
informal  wage.  The  rationed  unemployed  are 
measured by the distance e – d and the waiting 
unemployment,  by  the  distance  b  –  d.  Further 
details  are  provided  in  the  presentation  of  the 
microsimulation model further on. 
 
We only have one representative household in the 
CGE model and its income is composed of wage 
payments  (from  the  two  labour  categories), 
capital  payments,  dividends  and  transfers  from 
other agents. As opposed to what we would find in 
the CGE-IMH approach, the labour endowment is 
endogenous  (as  stated  above),  although  this  is 
only  factored  in  the  micro  model.  Workers  can 
move  in  and  out  of  unemployment  as  well  as 
between  the  formal  and  informal  markets  but 
these  movements  will  be  computed  in  the 
microsimulation  model  and  transferred  into  the 
CGE model in the resolution procedure.  
 
The  key  assumptions  to  capture  the  impact  of 
infrastructure  spending  concern  their  production 
externalities  and  the  government  budget 
constraint  to  fund  O&M  costs.  A  complete 
description of the model can be found in Estache 
et  al.  (2007).  This  first  equation  (1.1)  is  the 
government  budget  constraint  (equation  1.1) 
where government income (Yg) is spent on public 
services or expenditures (G) and on government 
savings (Sg), which will be used entirely for public 
investment.  
 
  (1.1) 
 
We assume that public spending is exogenous and 
that  public  savings  (the  budget  surplus)  is 
implicitly  exogenous  as  it  is  equal  to  public 
investment,  which  is  exogenous.  Hence,  to  fund 
new  public  infrastructure,  the  government  will 
need an endogenous source of revenue such as a 
tax  instrument  or  a  foreign  transfer  (aid).  We 
introduce  an  additional  assumption,  namely  that 
an increase in public infrastructure investment will 
generate  higher  O&M  costs  for  the  government. 
We draw this assumption from the estimations of 
Fay and Yepes (2003).
5  
 
The   externality   equation   (1.2)   is   the   other  
important assumption, given its role in increasing 
the total productivity of factors in the value added 
equation  (1.3).  For  this,  we  draw  on  the  vast 
literature  linking  public  infrastructure  to  private 
sector  factor  productivity,  including  Dumont  and 
Mesplé-Somps (2000) in a CGE context, although 
our  externality  function  does  not  include  private 
investment. This function was also used in Estache 
et al. (2008). The function defining the externality 





where θi is the externality or sectoral productivity 
effect,  which  is  a  function  of  the  ratio  of  new 
public  investment  (Itp)  over  past  public 
investment (Itpo) with a sector-specific elasticity 
(ξi).
6  The  externality  is  introduced  in  the  value 
added (Vai) equation: 
 
  (1.3) 
 
where  Ai  is  the  scale  parameter,  Ldi,  the  labour 
demand,  Kdi,  the  capital  demand,  and  α,  the 
Cobb-Douglas parameter. Hence, an increase in θi 
represents  a  Hicks  neutral  productivity 
improvement, like the one modelled in Yeaple and 
Golub  (2007).
7  With  this  formulation,  the 
infrastructure  investment  can  act  as  a  source  of 
comparative  advantage  because  the  function  is 
sector specific.  
 
Commodity  markets  are  balanced  through 
adjustments in market prices. The current account 
balance  is  fixed;  accordingly,  the  nominal 
exchange  rate  varies  to  allow  the  real  exchange 
rate to clear the current account balance. The GDP 
deflator is used as the numeraire in the model. We 
also  assume  in  a  standard  manner  that  the 
Philippines is a small open economy. Armington‟s 
(1969) assumption is adopted for the demand of 
imported  goods  (imperfect  substitution  with 
constant elasticity of substitution function (CES)) 
and  constant  elasticity  of  transformation  (CET) 
functions are used to model export supply.
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The  household  microsimulation  model 
(HHMS) 
The construction of the household microsimulation 
model (HHMS) relies on data for all of the 39,520 
households  from  the  1997  Family  Income  and 
Expenditure Survey (FIES) and on three rounds of 
the Labour Force Survey (LFS) run between 1997 
and 1998.
9 The HHMS comprises a representation 
of  household  income  structures  and  expenditure 
behaviour as well as their labour supply decisions. 
Household consumption is modelled with a linear 
expenditure  demand  system  (LES).  We  use  the 
calibration  method  proposed  by  Dervis  et  al. 
(1982).  Savings  and  income  tax  rates  are 
calibrated  according  to  the  observed  data  in  the 
survey.  All  transfers  received  and  paid  are 
exogenous. We consider that capital endowments 
are fixed at the levels observed in the 1997 FIES. 
In the FIES, we have information on the sector of 
activity of the household head and on the amount 
of non-wage income. This allows for a mapping of 
the sector of origin for household capital income. 
Based on information from the FIES and LFS, we 
classified  wage  earners  into  formal  and  informal 
workers  according  to  the  category  of  work 
specified in the survey.
10  
 
Our labour market mechanism is drawn from the 
Roy  (1951)  model,  which  was  revisited  by 
Heckman  and  Sedlacek  (1985)  and  further 
enriched by Magnac (1991). We selected the non 
competitive  version  of  the  models  presented  by 
Magnac  (1991),  as  it  includes  a  formal  and 
informal  market  with  unemployment.  The  formal 
market in non competitive; it has a rigid nominal 
wage and workers face a cost of entry to access 
this market. The fixed formal wage is above the 
market  equilibrium  wage,  which  creates  excess 
supply on this market. The rigid wage can reflect 
various  interventions  on  the  labour  market  such 
as  labour  union  contracts,  efficiency  wages  and 
regulated  wages.
11  The  labour  supply  model  is 
estimated with the two-step Heckman procedure. 
More details on the labour supply model and the 
results of the estimation  results can be found in 
Bourguignon  and  Savard  (2008).  The  estimated 
model  allows  us  to  compute  the  worker-specific 
cost  of  entry,  the  reservation  wage  and  the 
potential wage. Each of these elements is used in 
constructing our labour supply in the HHMS.  
 
The key feature of the labour supply model is the 
introduction of an endogenous labour supply, but 
it  also  serves  to  compute  changes  in  income, 
consumption  and  welfare  changes  at  the 
household  level.  We  introduce  mobility  between 
the  three  statuses  of  workers  and  potential 
workers, namely informal work, formal work and 
unemployment.  The  transformation  at  the  micro 
level  allows  us  to  allocate  changes  in  labour 
supply to the informal sector and unemployment 
in the HHMS model. We now describe how we go 
from the labour supply model to our HHMS model 
to construct our two labour supplies.  
 
For the formal market, we construct two queues. 
The first concerns the formal sector workers who 
can  be  laid  off  in  the  context  of  a  decrease  in 
formal  labour  demand  generated  by  the  CGE 
model.  The  second  concerns  unemployed  and 
informal market workers who supply their labour 
to the formal market when formal labour demand 
increases in the CGE model. We assume that firms 
have  perfect  knowledge  of  the  workers‟ 
productivity (implicitly their potential wage).  
 
If  formal  labour  demand  increases,  workers  are 
drawn  from  the  queue  of  informal  and 
unemployed workers. To be included in the queue, 
two conditions from our labour supply model must 
be  satisfied  by  workers:  the  formal  wage  minus 
the cost of entry into the formal sector  must be 
greater  than  both  the  reservation  wage  of  the 
worker  and  the  informal  wage.
12  Workers 
satisfying  these  two  conditions  are  then  ranked 
based  on  their  potential  wage  and  formal  sector 
firms recruit the most qualified workers from this 
queue. 
 
In  the  presence  of  a  decrease  in  formal  sector 
labour demand, the least productive formal sector 
workers, based on their potential wage computed 
from the labour supply model, will be laid off. The 
destination  of  laid  off  workers  depends  on  the 
reservation wage of the workers compared to the 
prevailing informal sector wage. If the reservation 
wage  is  above  the  informal  wage  the  workers 
become unemployed, and if it is lower they supply 
their  labour  to  the  informal  market.  The 
reservation  wage  check  with  the  informal  sector 
wage is not only applied to laid off workers in the 
formal  sector  but  also  to  active  informal  sector 
workers  and  the  unemployed;  the  change  in 
informal  wage  can  modify  the  status  of  either. 
This  procedure  provides  us  with  the  new  labour 
endowments  in  the  HHMS  to  compute  the  new 
income level, expenditure and change in welfare. 
The final step in the HHMS consists in computing 
the  variation  in  aggregate  labour  supply  in  the 
informal  sector  and  the  variations  in  aggregate 
consumption that will be used to link back to the 
CGE model.  
 
Resolving the model is done by iterating between 
the  CGE  and  HHMS  models.  Hence,  we  build  on 
the  CGE-MSS  approach  by  integrating  the 
feedback effect of the microsimulation model back 
into  the  CGE  model.  This  top  to  bottom  and 
bottom  to  top  resolution  process  is  performed 
until convergence and is  equivalent to a cobweb 
type  of  resolution  of  market  equilibrium. 
Performing this bi-directional link is equivalent to 
including  all  39,520  households  from  the 
household survey in the model.
13 
 
The  Top  Down  loop  presented  in  Figure  2  is 
implemented  in  the  following  way.  First,  the 
simulation is performed in the CGE model and we 
feed  the  variations  in  prices  (goods  and  factors) 
and  formal  labour  demand  from  this  model  into 
the  HHMS  model.  As  explained  in  the  previous 
sub-section  this  labour  demand  change,  and  the 
variation  in  the  informal  wage,  allows  us  to 
determine the labour endowment of workers.  SAVARD     Scaling up infrastructure spending in the Philippines        48 
 
 
Figure 2  Resolution procedure of the TD/BU approach 
 
 
Once  this  is  done,  we  can  determine  the  new 
income and consumption level of each household. 
We  then  aggregate  consumption  and  informal 
labour supply and compute the variations in these 
two  variables.  These  variations  are  finally 
introduced into the CGE module where aggregate 
consumption  and  informal  labour  supply  is 
exogenous.  We  repeat  this  loop  until  converging 
results are obtained for these two variables.
14 We 
know  that  there  are  conditions  that  satisfy  the 
stability  of  the  cobweb  resolution  approach  and 
these conditions also apply to the resolution of the 
TDBU approach. Our application of the CGE-TDBU 
approach  to  the  Philippines  is  programmed  with 
GAMS  software.  Our  CGE  model  has  873 
equations and endogenous variables, whereas the 
microsimulation  model  has  829,920  equations 
with 829,920 endogenous variables. 
 
 
THE SIMULATIONS  
 
In  order  to  analyze  the  macro  and  distributional 
impacts  of  scaling  up  infrastructure  investment 
under different funding mechanisms, we contrast 
two  types  of  infrastructure  investments;  a  non 
productive  one  and  a  productive  one.
15  These 
simulations are well justified in the context of the 
economic crisis and the larger debate on scaling 
up infrastructure in developing countries described 
in the introduction. We simulate an increase of 30 
percent in public investment on infrastructure with 
respect to the level of investment in the reference 
period.  We  compare  three  funding  mechanisms 
consisting  of  increases  in  the  value  added  tax 
rate,  the  income  tax  rate  and  foreign  aid.  It  is 
important to highlight that the effective tax rates 
observed  in  the  SAM  are  relatively  small  in  the 
reference period: between 2 and 3 percent for the 
two  weighted  average  tax  rates.  Hence,  the 
increase  in  these  taxes  required  to  fund  the 
program is large in percentage terms, but not in 
nominal  terms.  The  increases  necessary  for  the 
three funding schemes are presented in Table A.3 
in  the  appendix.  Productive  externalities 
contribute  to  increased  economic  activity,  which 
increases  government  revenues.  Hence,  the 
funding requirements are not equal to the  direct 
investment and O&M costs.  
 
 
IMPACT ANALYSIS OF THE SCENARIOS 
 
A  comparative  analysis  of  productive  and  non-
productive  investments  under  three  funding 
mechanisms  allows  us  to  highlight  the  most 
efficient  funding  mechanism.  We  explore  the 
effect  on  different  macroeconomic  and  sectoral 
variables in addition to the distributional impacts. 
To  simplify  the  presentation,  we  focus  on  the 
macroeconomic  variables  and  the  key  sectoral 
impacts contributing to welfare and distributional 
impacts,  namely  market  prices  and  returns  to 
factors.  We  compare  funding  options  throughout 
the  section.  We  concentrate  on  productive 
investments  with  a  brief comparative  analysis  to 
non  productive  investments  at  the  end  of  the 
section.  Distribution  analysis  follows  in  the 
subsequent  section.  When  looking  at  results 
(Tables  1  to  3),  it  is  important  to  keep  in  mind 
that our current account balance is fixed.
16  
 
Before moving on to the specific simulations, we 
can begin with a few general comments. First, the 
impacts  on  GDP  and  most  macro  variables  are 
relatively modest. This results from the fact that, 
in  nominal  terms,  the  30%  increase  in  public 
investment  is  not  large  compared  to  size  of  the 
economy  (0.48%).  However,  this  is  not  an 
important issue as we are mostly interested in the 
comparative  analysis  between  the  different 
scenarios. The second point is that all simulations 
produce  a  positive  impact  on  GDP,  although  the 
non  productive  simulations  produce  a  very  small 
impact. This positive effect comes in part from the 
productivity  gains  of  the  infrastructure  but  also 
from  the  economic  activity  generated  by  these 
investments.
17  The  positive  effect  helps  create 
employment in the construction sector and in the 
public services to operate and maintain this new 
infrastructure.  The  sectors  supplying  goods  and 
services  more   intensively  to  these two sectors,  
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Table 1  Macroeconomic results (% variations) 
 
Source: Values computed by the author 
 
 
   
Table 2  Sectoral results: rental rate of capital (% variation) 
 



















86476.9 0.15 0.74 0.17 0.75 0.14 0.73
Household 
savings
9651.8  -2.20 -3.24 -1.98 -2.99 -3.41 -4.21
Informal Wage 0.5 0.43 0.98 0.49 1.05 0.39 0.94
Government 
income 20367 3.94 3.94 3.94 3.94 3.94 3.94
Firms' income 26172.9 -0.14 0.52 -0.17 0.49 -0.17 0.51
Government 
savings 13369 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00 30.00
Government 
expenditure 16818.8 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38 2.38
Private 
investment 23161.2 -1.23 -0.54 -1.86 -1.07 -1.54 -0.82
Firms' savings 7810.5 0,00 0.95 -0.31 0.90  -0.30 0.92
Unemployment 
rate 16.8 -1.05 -1.95 -1.14 -1.95 -0.9 -1.84
Nominal 
exchange rate 1 0.69 0.39 0.06 -0.13  -1.20 -1.18
Gross domestic 
product 104510.7 0.16 0.79 0.17 0.80 0.15 0.79

















Palay & corn 1 -0.76 2.13 -0.49 2.36 -0.16 2.66
Fruit & vegetable 1 -1.24 0.17 -1.16 0.24 -0.34 0.94
Coconut 1 -0.45 1.68 -0.34 1.79 -1.05 1.16
Livestock 1 -0.71 1.66 -0.87 1.49 0.79 2.92
Fishing 1 -0.5 0.92 -0.57 0.84 -0.33 1.07
Other agriculture 1 -0.11 0.79 -0.29 0.65 -1.15 -0.09
Logging & timber 1 1.3 4.33 0.79 3.9 1.03 4.09
Mining 1 0.33 1.14 -0.06 0.81 -2.49 -1.25
Manufacturing 1 -0.1 -0.26 -0.04 -0.2 -1.46 -1.4
Rice manufacturing 1 -0.26 0.86 -0.05 1.03 0.09 1.15
Meat industry 1 -0.01 -0.32 -0.19 -0.49 1.12 0.62
Food manufacturing 1 -1.41 -1.82 -1.2 -1.64 -0.87 -1.38
Electricity, gas & water 1 0.32 -0.39 0.49 -0.27 0.65 -0.11
Construction 1 2.03 2.62 1.96 2.56 2.9 3.34
Commerce 1 -0.18 0.67 -0.14 0.7 -1,00 -0.02
Trans. & comm. 1 0.55 0.98 0.16 0.67 0.82 1.22
Finance 1 0.5 1.3 0.72 1.48 0.07 0.94
Real estate 1 -0.48 -0.55 -1.33 -1.31 0.34 0.14
Services 1 0.07 0.14 0.51 0.52 0.09 0.17
r              
(rental rate 
of capital)
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Table 3  Sectoral results: market prices (% variation) 
 
Source: Values computed by the author 
 
 
and  their  workers,  benefit  the  most.  The 
expansion  of  the  construction  sector  and  public 
services  creates  employment  directly  and 
indirectly with  an increase in the informal wage. 
This  effect  is  possible  given  the  presence  of 
unemployment  in  the  model.  Hence,  these  new 
workers contribute to increasing GDP. 
 
The impact on the aggregate household is positive 
for all simulations and we observe a crowding out 
effect on private investment in all scenarios. A fall 
in the unemployment rate and an increase in the 
nominal informal wage  rate are also found in all 
simulations. The increase in government income is 
the  same  in  all  simulations  as  this  is  implicitly 
directly  tied  to  the  simulated  increase  in  public 
investment and the O&M cost associated with the 
investment. Other variables, such as the nominal 
exchange  rate,  and  firm  income  and  savings, 
exhibit qualitative and quantitative differences. 
 
Investment funded by the value added tax 
In this simulation, the increase in  investment by 
the government is funded by a uniform increase in 
the  effective  value  added  tax.  In  the  reference 
period, the value added tax (VAT) is not uniform 
and  the  differentiated  structure  is  maintained  in 
this  simulation.  We  hold  exogenous  the  other 
public  expenditures  made  by  governments  but 
assume,  as  was  explained  earlier,  that  the  new 
investment will require some new M&O spending. 
The  required  tax  increase  is  0.7  percentage 
points, raising the rate from 2.5% to 3.2% (Table  
A.3). 
The  first  observation,  focusing  on  productive 
infrastructure  investments,  is  that  this  option 
seems  to  favour  households  over  firms,  because 
informal wages increases (0.98%) more than the 
average rental rate of capital (0.63%). Since firm 
income originates essentially from capital income, 
whereas for households it is a mixture of the two 
sources,  the  households  come  out  winners.  The 
increase  in  informal  wages  originates  from 
pressure  for  labour  demand  in  public  services 
(1.87%,  from  Table  A.4  in  the  appendix)  that 
must  grow  to  meet  the  M&O  needs  created  by 
new  investment  and  the  expansion  of  the 
construction sector (1.81%; Table 2) to build the 
new infrastructure.  Given the capital/labour ratio 
of  these  two  sectors,  their  expansion  increases 
demand for labour more than for capital. 
  
The  increase  in  household  income  (0.74%)  is 
explained  by  the  reduction  in  unemployment 
(1.95%)  and  the  increase  in  nominal  informal 
wages  (0.98%).  Total  private  investment  falls 
(0.54%), which is one of the strongest impacts at 
the  macro  level,  indicating  a  crowding  out  of 
private  investment.  The  nominal  exchange  rate 
increases  by  0.39%,  which  represents  a 
depreciation  of  the  real  exchange  rate.  Price 
effects  are  generally  increasing  for  most  sectors 
with  the  strongest  increase  in  the  logging  and 
timber  sector  (Table  3).  The  real  estate  sector 
shows the strongest price contraction.  
 
Investment funded by income tax  

















Palay & corn 1.01 -0.09 1.65 -0.24 1.52 -0.21 1.55
Fruit & vegetable 1.02 0.25 0.77 -0.55 0.1 -0.19 0.4
Coconut 1.02 0.62 1.61 0.01 1.11 -0.45 0.71
Livestock 1.01 0.45 1.33 -0.31 0.68 0.17 1.09
Fishing 1.01 0.19 0.81 -0.24 0.43 -0.16 0.51
Other agriculture 1.03 0.57 0.76 0.06 0.33 -0.6 -0.23
Logging & timber 1.01 1.12 2.38 0.46 1.83 0.32 1.71
Mining 1.01 0.69 0.42 0.08 -0.09 -1.07 -1.06
Manufacturing 1.08 0.83 0.4 0.07 -0.23 -0.61 -0.8
Rice manufacturing 1,000 0.16 1.27 -0.11 1.04 -0.2 0.97
Meat industry 1.01 0.7 0.91 -0.15 0.19 0.21 0.5
Food manufacturing 1.03 0.47 0.47 -0.24 -0.12 -0.37 -0.24
Electricity, gas & water 1.01 0.97 -0.02 0.25 -0.63 0.05 -0.79
Construction 1.01 1.13 0.82 0.52 0.31 0.33 0.15
Commerce 1.05 1.02 0.8 0.06 -0.01 -0.39 -0.38
Trans. & comm. 1.01 1.08 0.68 0.18 -0.07 -0.03 -0.25
Finance 1.05 2.2 1.92 0.35 0.37 -0.18 -0.08
Real estate 1,000 0.03 -0.68 -0.61 -1.23 0.19 -0.54
Services 1.04 2.1 1.4 0.2 -0.18 0.32 -0.09
Public services 1,000 0.51 0.5 0.17 0.23 0.05 0.12
Pq              
(market 
price)
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the effective income tax rate rises from 2.2% to 
3.0%  (a  37%  increase).  The  macro  results  are 
quite similar to the previous simulation with main 
differences  observed  for  the  nominal  exchange 
rate, with an appreciation of 0.13% compared to a 
depreciation of 0.39% in the previous simulation, 
indicating a very slight Dutch disease effect. There 
is  also  more  crowding  out  as  total  investment 
decreases  more  (1.07%)  compared  to  the 
previous simulation (0.54%). The slightly stronger 
negative impact  on  firm  income  is  the  source  of 
this  difference.  The  other  macro  level  results 
largely resemble the VAT-funded scenario.  
 
For  the  rental  rate  of  capital,  the  qualitative 
effects are the same as in the previous simulation, 
although the weighted average increase is slightly 
weaker  (0.60%,  compared  to  0.63%).  Some 
sectoral differences are observed in the returns to 
capital.  Market  price  variations  (Table  3)  are 
smaller  for  most  sectors  and  qualitative 
differences  are  observed  in  six  sectors  with  the 
largest gap for the service sector passing from a 
1.4%  increase  for  the  VAT  scenario  to  a  0.18% 
decrease in this case. These stronger differences 
at the market price will have distributional impacts 
further on. 
 
Investment funded by foreign aid 
At  the  macro  level,  the  main  difference  is 
observed for the nominal exchange rate, which is 
not  surprising  insofar  as  the  current  account 
balance is fixed and an increase in foreign aid thus 
requires an appreciation of the exchange rate. The 
Dutch  disease  effect  is  thus  greater  than  in  the 
income  tax  simulation.  The  unemployment  rate 
decreases  less  compared  to  the  previous  two 
simulations.  Other  macro  results  are  almost 
identical to the other simulations. 
 
The  market  price  and  rental  rate  of  capital  are 
more  sensitive  to  this  funding  scheme  and  we 
have  many  qualitative  changes  in  the  sectoral 
impacts compared to the first two scenarios. The 
differences  are  greater  when  we  compare  these 
results  with  the  VAT  scenario.  These  stronger 
price  differences  should  have  a  distributional 
impact on the income side (rental rate of capital) 
and on the consumption side (market prices). 
 
Comparing  productive  and  non  productive 
infrastructure 
We  note  a  weaker  positive  effect  on  GDP, 
household  income  and  firm  income  in  the  non-
productive  investment  scenarios.  This  is  not 
surprising  as  we  built  in  this  difference.  As  was 
the case for productive investments, the choice of 
funding  mechanism  does  not  have  much  impact 
on the macro results. However, the crowding out 
effect  is  almost  doubled  in  the  non  productive 
investment  scenarios,  compared  to  productive 
investments.  
 
For price variations (market price and rental rate 
of capital) the effects are quite different. For the 
VAT  funding  option,  nine  out  of  the  nineteen 
sectors exhibit a qualitative change in terms of the 
impacts  on  the  rental  rate  of  capital.  For  all 
agricultural  sectors,  the  difference  is  strong, 
ranging  from  a  0.9%  improvement  for  other 
agriculture to a 2.89% improvement in the palay 
and  corn  sector.  The  pattern  of  differences 
between  the  income  tax  scenarios  is  similar  to 
that  of  the  VAT  simulations.  The  foreign  aid 
scenarios  generate  closer  results,  with  only  five 
sectors  exhibiting  qualitative  differences. 
Moreover,  the  quantitative  gap  between  the 
productive and non productive scenarios is weaker 
with  foreign  aid  financing.  As  for  market  price 
variations, we observe many differences between 
non  productive  and  productive  options  with 
between  five  (VAT)  and  eight  (foreign  aid) 
qualitative differences. There is no clear trend that 
can be observed either.  
 
Before  moving  on  to  the  distributional  impact  of 
our  policies,  we  can  summarize  the  key  effects 
that will play an important role. VAT funding will 
have a tendency to favour sectors in which initial 
VAT  rates  were  lower  and,  consequently, 
households that consume a lower share of goods 
and services with high VAT rates in the reference 
period.  Workers  and  owners  of  capital  in  the 
sectors  with  higher  VAT  rates  will  experience  a 
stronger  negative  impact.  Moving  on  to  the 
income tax scenario,  on the income side  we will 
have  a  stronger  negative  impact  on  households 
that  pay  income  taxes.  As  a  result,  the  price  of 
goods  consumed  by  households  with  higher 
income  decrease  more  compared  to  the  first 
scenario.  The  price  effect  may  dominate  the 
income effect for certain households. Foreign aid 
financing produces a price and income effect via 
the  appreciation  of  the  exchange  rate  given  the 
fixed  current  account  balance.  This  will  favour 
consumers  of  imported  goods  on  the  price  side. 
On the income side, the non tradable sectors will 
be  favoured  and  hence  capital  owners  and 
workers  used  intensively  in  these  sectors  will 
benefit the most.  
 
The  final  impact  is  a  combination  of  these  more 
direct effects and indirect effects captured by all 
assumptions  and  interactions  in  the  model.  It  is 
also important to note that, contrary to many CGE 
microsimulation  models,  we  capture  discrete 
changes in income, and not only marginal changes 
in  income,  with  workers  moving  in  and  out  of 
unemployment  and  between  the  formal  and 
informal  sectors.  This  can  produce  unusual 
distributional effects. For example, a relatively rich 
household  in  the  reference  period  can  become 
unemployed  after  simulation  and  lose  a  large 





For  the  distributional  analysis,  we  apply  poverty 
indices and compute growth incidence curves. The 
poverty  index  chosen  (FGT)  is  the  additively 
decomposable  P   proposed  by  Foster,  Greer  and 
Thorbecke (1984).
18 To complete the distributional 
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Table 4  Poverty index results (% variation) 
 
Source: Values computed by the author. Notes: See Table A.2 for educational codes 
 
 
(GIC) proposed by Ravallion and Chen (2003). 
 
Poverty analysis 
We  use  the  change  in  household  welfare, 
measured by  change in real income, to evaluate 
the impact of the policy on each household. This 
approach has the advantage of taking into account 
the price and income effects simultaneously. This 
approach  is  quite  standard  in  the  context  of 
macro-micro  CGE  analysis.  The  CGE  top-
down/bottom-up model generates post simulation 
changes in welfare at the household level that are 
used  for  poverty  analysis.  Households  can  be 
grouped  into  various  socio-economic  categories 
for  the  analysis,  which  can  be  repeated  for  the 
base  period  and  each  simulation.  For  our 
application,  we  group  households  based  on  the 
education level of the household head. 
 
The  first  point  we  can  make  is  that  poverty 
impacts  are  relatively  small  (Table  4).  As  we 
highlighted in the macro analysis, this comes from 
the  relatively  small  nominal  increase  in  public 
investment,  but  we  can  still  draw  interesting 
conclusions  on  relative  impacts  between 
productive  and  non  productive  investments  and 
between  the  three  funding  schemes.  Starting  at 
the  national  level,  with  non  productive 
investments,  we  observe  a  decrease  in  poverty 
only  for  the  VAT  scenario.  This  reduction  is 
observed  for  the  three  poverty  indices,  ranging 
from  0.26%  for  the  headcount  index  (FGT-0)  to 
0.30%  for poverty  severity  (FGT-2).  The  income 
tax  and  foreign  aid  scenarios  for  non  productive 
investment  produce  an  increase  in  poverty 
severity ranging up to 1.33% for the income tax 
option  and  0.88%  for  foreign  aid.  This  is 
interesting in that GDP and aggregate household 
income  increased  in  both  those  scenarios.  This 
illustrates  the  importance  of  using  a 
microsimulation  approach  to  determine  the 
distributional and welfare impact of such reforms. 
The  option  generating  the  greatest  increases  in 
poverty is the income tax option. 
 
Productive  investments  reduce  poverty  under  all 
funding  mechanisms,  but  produce  a  similar 
pattern in that the best option is the VAT, which 
produces  reductions  in  poverty  ranging  from 
0.86% for the headcount index to 1.57% for the 
severity  index.  The  least  positive  option  is  the 
income tax, which generates a poverty reduction 
of around 0.2% for all three indices. This result is 
not  surprising  insofar  as  the  households  absorb 
fully and directly the funding option as a negative 
income  effect.  Foreign  aid  provides  an 
intermediary option,  with reductions of 0.41% for 























FGT-0  National  0.311  -0.26  -0.86  0.67  -0.19  0.49  -0.41 
FGT-1  National  0.096  -0.27  -1.29  1.05   -0.20  0.68  -0.52 
FGT-2  National  0.04   -0.30  -1.57  1.33  -0.22  0.88  -0.6 
0  0.564  -0.36  -1.08  0.51  0.07  0.71  0.2 
1  0.501  -0.37  -0.89  0.31  -0.26  0.27  -0.61 
2  0.384  -0.29  -0.8  0.70  -0.26  0.3  -0.42 
3  0.317  0.35  -0.71  1.52  0.27  1.38   -0.30 
4  0.184  -0.34  -0.94  0.85  -0.33  0.2  -0.54 
5  0.092  -0.47  -0.83  1.58  -0.35  1.35  0.40 
6  0.021  -0.42  -0.42  -0.42  -0.42  3.54  -0.42 
0  0.185  -0.19  -0.99  0.96  -0.05  0.92  -0.09 
1  0.168  -0.24  -1.19  0.94   -0.20  0.61   -0.50 
2  0.116   -0.30  -1.36  1.05  -0.23  0.62  -0.61 
3  0.090  -0.32  -1.37  1.15  -0.17  0.79  -0.51 
4  0.048  -0.31  -1.56  1.29  -0.22  0.71  -0.71 
5  0.022  -0.26  -1.65  1.60  -0.11  1.05  -0.57 
6  0.005  -0.49  -1.87  1.43  -0.24  1.51   -0.20 
0  0.08  -0.25  -1.32  1.25  -0.09  1.14  -0.18 
1  0.075  -0.27  -1.48  1.23  -0.23  0.82  -0.58 
2  0.048  -0.32  -1.64  1.34  -0.26  0.82   -0.70 
3  0.035  -0.36  -1.66  1.41   -0.20  0.95  -0.64 
4  0.018  -0.31  -1.78  1.57  -0.23  0.93  -0.76 
5  0.007  -0.28  -2.01  1.92  -0.19  1.22  -0.78 




Foreign Aid  Value added tax  Income tax SAVARD     Scaling up infrastructure spending in the Philippines        53 
Moving  on  to  the  decomposition  analysis,  we 
observe  a  relatively  uniform  qualitative  impact 
across  the  7  household  types  –  by  education  of 
household head – for non productive investments. 
We  only  observe  two  cases  of  qualitative 
differences,  namely  for  the  VAT  simulation,  in 
which the poverty headcount increases for group 3 
whereas  other  households  benefit  from  a 
reduction in poverty indices, and the income tax 
simulation, where the headcount for group 6 falls 
by  0.42%  whereas  other  households  experience 
an  increase  in  poverty  indices.  For  the  VAT 
simulation, we can identify a weak trend favouring 
the most educated households. For the income tax 
option,  the  most  educated  groups  (4,  5  and  6) 
have the largest poverty increase when using the 
poverty gap and severity indices. For the foreign 
aid funding scheme, the groups suffering the least 
are groups 1 and 2 for the three indices with one 
exception  for  FGT-0  where  the  most  favoured 
group is group 4. 
 
The  productive  investment  provides  more 
interesting  results.  For  the  VAT  option,  the 
headcount index indicates that the least educated 
would be most advantaged, while the poverty gap 
and  severity  indices  reveal  a  more  regressive 
option in which most educated households benefit 
the  most.
19  When  the  income  tax  serves  as  the 
funding mechanism, we cannot find a clear trend. 
Each  indicator  provides  a  different  picture.  The 
headcount  index  seems  to  favour  the  most 
educated  and  group  3  is  faced  with  a  0.27% 
increase in poverty. In terms of the poverty gap 
(FGT-1), we observe the most positive effects for 
group 6, and the least positive effects for groups 5 
and 0. Poverty severity favours group 2, 1 and 4, 
and groups 6 and 0 are the losers. For the foreign 
aid simulation, we seem to have a clearer winner 
with  group  4  being  top  or  second  in  terms  of 
positive impact and group 0 being last or second 
to  last  for  all  indices.  Interestingly,  group  5  has 
the  worst  situation  for  the  headcount  index  and 
the best when using the severity index.  
When  comparing  each  funding  option  we  can 
clearly  conclude  that  the  VAT  is  the  most 
favourable  option  both  at  the  national  level  and 
when looking at household decomposition results. 
Moreover,  all  groups  benefit  for  all  indices.  In 
addition,  the  poverty  reduction  impact  is  quite 
large  given  the  weak  changes  in  macro  and 
sectoral  variables.  The  foreign  aid  option  also 
dominates the income tax option for the poverty 
depth  and  severity  indices.  For  the  headcount 
index,  two  groups  (group  0  and  4)  suffer  more 
with the foreign aid compared to the income tax 
option.  For  the  other  groups,  the  foreign  aid 
option is more favourable. 
 
Comparing  the  micro  distributional  results  with 
poverty results illustrates the importance of using 
a CGE microsimulation approach since the income 
tax option is the most favourable when looking at 
aggregate  variables  such  as  GDP,  aggregate 
household  income,  informal  wage  and 
unemployment, whereas it is the least favourable 
in terms of poverty impacts.  
 
Growth incidence curves 
We  computed  the  GIC  for  the  three  productive 
scenarios  (Figure  3  to  5).  A  caveat  must  be 
highlighted for comparison of the two tools used. 
In the first case, households remain in the same 
group whereas for the GIC curves, a household in 
the top of the distribution can drop to the bottom 
and  this  is  not  fully  captured  given  that  the 
approach compares households at a specific rank 
and  not  the  households  before  and  after  the 
simulation.  The  two  tools  are  thus 
complementary. 
 
It is interesting to note that in the first scenario 
(Value  Added  Tax),  we  observe  in  Figure  3  the 
largest  gains  at  the  two  extremes  of  the 
distribution. If we remove the bottom and top two 
deciles,  we  note  a  slightly  positive  GIC. This is 
consistent  with  the  decomposition  of  poverty 
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Figure 3  Income growth curve: VAT-funded productive infrastructure 
 
 




Figure 5  Income growth curve: foreign-aid funded productive infrastructure 
 
 
to benefit the most. 
 
Moving on to the income tax funding option, we 
have a clearer positively sloped GIC compared to 
the previous one, in which we needed to exclude 
the  extreme  deciles.  In  this  case,  the  bottom  5 
percent are clearly losers compared to the rest of 
the  distribution,  with  the  exception  of  the  top 
percentile,  which  also  seems  to  be  a  loser.  This 
apparently counterintuitive result reflects the fact 
that  general  equilibrium  price  effects,  which 
favour the richer percentiles, dominate the direct 
income effect of increasing the income tax. 
 
The foreign aid scenario presents a much more 
horiztonal or proportional impact compared to the 
two previous scenarios. The bottom part of the 
distribution is similar to the VAT option and the 
top of the distribution is similar for the three 
scenarios. 
 
In  this  context,  no  option  seems to exhibit pro- 
poor features, with the third one looking to be the 
closest  to  that  option  and  the  income  tax  being 
the most favourable to the households in the top 
half of the distribution. When comparing with the 
FGT  indices,  we  had  the  VAT  as  being  the  most 
interesting  option,  followed  by  foreign  aid  and 
finally the income tax option. In the case of the 
GIC,  if  the  objective  is  to  choose  the  least 
regressive option, one would prefer the foreign aid 
option  followed  by  the  VAT  option,  with  the 





In  this  paper  we  present  the  main  steps  to 
implementing  a  variant  of  the  CGE  integrated 
multi-household  approach  that  offers  more 
flexibility compared to the standard version of this 
approach, namely introducing endogenous labour 
supply and unemployment into the model. We also 
illustrate how to exploit this modelling exercise to SAVARD     Scaling up infrastructure spending in the Philippines        55 
analyze  the  distributional  impact  of  scaling  up 
infrastructure  investment  on  macroeconomic, 
sectoral variables in the Philippines. The approach 
allows us to capture numerous issues surrounding 
infrastructure  expansion  among  which  are 
productivity  externalities,  job  creation,  relative 
price  changes,  crowing  out,  Dutch  disease, 
funding issues, fiscal constraints and distributional 
analysis.  We  build  on  the  models  presented  in 
papers  such  as  Adam  and  Bevan  (2006)  and 
Estache  et  al.  (2008)  by  introducing  rigorous 
distributional  analysis.  Our  macro  results  are 
different  than  those  of  these  authors  given  the 
presence  of  unemployment,  which  contributes  to 
attenuating or reversing the Dutch disease effect 
that is also softened by the production externality 
assumption.  We  also  present  a  framework  that 
allows the analyst to explore the poverty impact of 
such  programs  and  identify  the  most  favourable 
funding  option  based  on  two  distributional 
analyses  (FGT  and  GIC).  As  in  Estache  et  al. 
(2008),  we  do  not  observe  strong  differences  at 
the macro level when comparing funding options 
to  scale  up  infrastructure.  However,  our  poverty 
analysis  allowed  us  to  clearly  rank  the 
performance  of  each  funding  option  to  establish 
that  the  VAT  is  most  favourable,  followed  by 
foreign aid and finally income taxes.  
 
Our static modelling framework does not allow us 
to  fully  capture  the  negative  impact  of  crowding 
out  of  private  investment.  Another  issue  is  that 
the returns on investment in infrastructure might 
come in the medium to long term. To improve the 
analysis  on  this  front,  a  recursive  dynamic 
framework would be a more appropriate tool. In 
our future research we will extend this model in 
this  direction.  The  major  challenge  for  this  work 
program will be to introduce a capital reallocation 
mechanism at the micro level. To our knowledge, 
only  one  set  of  authors  (Annabi  et  al.,  2005) 
applied  a  dynamic  CGE  microsimulation  model, 
but  they  failed  to  rigorously  capture  the 
distributional  factor  growth  issue  as  stated  in 
Davies  (2009).  The  uniform  redistributed  capital 
growth underestimated the distributional impact of 
the growth elements in the model and this issue 
needs to be resolved along the lines suggested by 




1   Estache (2007) provides an interesting survey 
of  the  state  of infrastructure  for  development 
and review the main issues at stake for policy 
makers  of  developing  countries  and  donor 
agencies. 
2  In  fact,  micro  household  functions  do  not 
aggregate  perfectly  if  they  exhibit 
heterogeneity for fixed (or endogenous) shares 
of  consumption,  savings  or  taxation.  Since 
these  shares  are  generally  calibrated  to 
reproduce  the  reference  period  in  micro 
household  models,  the  aggregation  of  micro 
behaviour  functions  do  not  scale  up  to  a 
representative  agent.  In  other  words,  the 
equilibrium  consumption  level  of  the 
representative  agent  is  not  equivalent  to  the 
aggregated consumption level of households in 
a  micro-household  model  with  the  same 
functional  forms.  In  addition,  when  a  worker 
has the option of working or not working, we 
have a discrete regime switching function, and 
aggregation  conditions  disappear  completely 
(Bourguignon  et  al.  2005).  For  further 
elaboration  see  Appendix  1.  For  a  detailed 
discussion  of  the  aggregation  of  micro 
household  behaviour  to  a  representative 
household, the reader can consult Deaton and 
Muelbaueur  (1980).  Bourguignon  and  Savard 
(2008) also describe this problem. 
3   Workers  on  the  formal  market  are  mostly 
skilled  workers  while  workers  on  the  informal 
market are mostly unskilled. 
4   A  minimum  wage  for  private  sector  formal 
sector workers was set at 250 in 2001, which 
represented approximately 4.80$ US. A salary 
grid  is  also  in  place  for  this  segment  of  the 
labour market. 
5   We used the average of road, electricity, water, 
sanitation  and  telecommunications 
infrastructure, which provides for a ω value of 
1.03. 
6   The values for this parameter were constructed 
using  a  combination  of  information  from 
Estache  et  al.  (2008)  and  Harchaoui  and 
Tarkhani (2003). In general, the values of our 
parameters  are  conservative  with  respect  to 
this literature, ranging from 0.01 to 0.038. See 
Table  A.1  in  the  appendix  2  for  specific 
parameter values. 
7   This  formulation  is  also  commonly  used  in 
studies  estimating  parameters  of  the 
externalities  of  public  infrastructure  on  total 
factor  productivity  such  as  Aschauer  (1989), 
Gramlich  (1994)  and  Dessus  and  Herrera 
(1996), among others. 
8  The  complete  set  of  equations  and  variables 
can be provided upon request. 
9  Interestingly,  the  FIES  1997  and  LFS  1997-
1998 are implemented from that same master 
survey. Over 93 percent of households in the 
FIES 1997 are present in the three rounds of 
the  LFS  surveys  used.  This  information  from 
the  LFS  essentially  was  used  for  the 
econometric estimation in combination with the 
FIES  1997.  For  further  information  on  the 
construction of the data base and combination 
procedures  from  the  two  compatible  data 
sources, the reader can consult Savard (2006). 
10  The information on the type of work performed 
by the head of the household is very precise, 
with  a  decomposition  of  200  types  of  work 
categories. Given the rich set of information, it 
is  relatively  easy  to  classify  the  workers  as 
formal and informal workers. 
11  In  the  Philippines,  formal  wages  are  fixed  by 
regional  wage  boards.  For  further  information 
the  reader  can  consult  the  web  page  of  the 
National  Wage  and  Productivity  Commission 
(http://www.nwpc.dole.gov.ph/). 
12  The cost of entry represents various items such 
as  search  time,  human  capital  investment, 
networking, etc. This cost is specific to workers SAVARD     Scaling up infrastructure spending in the Philippines        56 
and is estimated. For details on this procedure 
to  obtain  this  cost,  the  reader  can  consult  
Bourguignon and Savard (2008). 
13  See Bourguignon and Savard (2008) for formal 
proof of this equivalence. 
14 Convergence is generally obtained between 10 
and  12  loops.  Given  the  small  number  of 
iterations  required,  a  sequential  resolution  of 
each  loop  can  be  performed  without  any 
problem.  Various  methods  can  be  used  to 
implement  an  automated  iteration  process  in 
GAMS. 
15  The non productive investment is used mainly 
to  isolate  the  productivity  effects  from  other 
effects  of  the  simulations.  It  is  not  meant  to 
represent  a  specific  type  of  non  productive 
investment such as monuments. 
16  The  current  account  is  balanced  by  adjusting 
the  nominal  exchange  rate.  Finally,  in  the 
tables, we present the nominal exchange rate. 
But this rate can also be interpreted as the real 
exchange  rate  because  our  price  index  is 
exogenous  such  that  the  variation  in  the 
nominal  exchange  rate  is  equivalent  to  the 
variation in the real exchange rate. 
17  This is precisely the objective of many stimulus 
plans  implemented  in  a  large  number  of 
countries during the recent economic crisis. 
18  FGT  poverty  indices  are  helpful  in  the 
framework of this analysis and make it possible 
to  measure  changes  in  the  incidence  of 
poverty,  as  well  as  in  its  depth  and  severity. 
For  detailed  information  on  the  FGT  index 
family, see Ravallion (1994). 
19  The  poverty  indices  at  the  reference  period 
reveal  that  the  more  educated  the  head  of 
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Appendix 1  The Aggregation Problem 
 
According  to Deaton  and  Muellbauer  (1980),  the 
aggregation  problem  is  defined  as  the  passage 
from  the  microeconomic behaviour  of  consumers 
(or  workers)  to  the  aggregate  demand  (labour 
supply) analysis. Or, as Preston (1959) states, the 
aggregation  problem  is  tied  to  the  link  between 
micro and macro theory and therefore differences 
that  can  occur  between  large  models 
(microsimulation  models)  and  smaller  models 
(macro  models)  relying  on  aggregated  variables 
and  parameters.  This  is  exactly  the  problem  at 
hand  with  linking  CGE  models  with 
microsimulation  models.  To  respond  to  this 
problem,  a  few  decades  back  Gorman  (1953) 
demonstrated  that  using  or  assuming  the  same 
marginal  consumption  and  saving  propensities 
was  sufficient  to  solve  this  problem  and  obtain 
perfect  linear  aggregation.  According  to  Deaton 
and Muellbauer (1980), this solution is extremely 
restrictive  since  it  imposes  linear  and  identical 
Engle  curves  for  all  households  in  a 
microsimulation model. Moreover, this assumption 
is  incompatible  with  empirical  analysis  of 
household  consumption  behaviour.  The  second 
problem is linked to the household specific labour 
supply. Deaton and Muellbauer (1980) present the 
conditions  for  aggregation  of  labour  supply  with 
the following cost function: 
 
  (A.1) 
 
Where u is the utility level,  w, the wage, p, the 
price level of goods, T, time endowment for work, 
µ,  the  non  work  income  or  transfer  from  other 
agents and Y, the income of the worker.  In this 
context, leisure is treated as a good with price w. 
Perfect  linear  aggregation  is  possible  if  the  cost 
function has the following form: 
 
  (A.2) 
 
Average  leisure  must  be  a  function  of  average 
income (Y ¯), wage (w) and prices (p). We can see 
that the problem is tied to the demand for goods.  
Indeed, it is plausible that prices are the same for 
all  consumers,  yet  w  varies  between  households 
given  specific  characteristics  such    that  the 
function b(w,p) will be specific to each household. 
Therefore, the marginal consumption share will be 
household specific for good i,  logb/ logpi. In this 
case, perfect aggregation is impossible. To obtain 
perfect  aggregation,  the  derivative  of  the  labour 
income with respect to non labour income, µ and 
the  derivative  between  labour  income  and  time 
endowment  must  be  identical  for  all  workers. 
According  to  Heckman  et  al.  (1998),  worker-
specific labour supply is one of the most important 
factors in explaining the differential distributional 
impact of policy reform. 
 
 
Appendix 2 Tables 
 




Table A.2 Educational code definition 
Education 
Code  Level of education 
1  Elementary (not graduated) 
2  Elementary graduate 
3  1
st to 3
rd Year High school 
4  High School Graduate 
5  College Undergraduate 
6  At least College graduate 
0  Not reported or no grade 
branches ξ value
Palay & corn 0,01











Electricity, gas & water 0,039
Construction 0,021
Commerce 0,022
Trans. & comm. 0,018
Finance 0,013
Real estate 0,027
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Table A.4 Sectoral results: Value added (% variation) 
 















Level Base 2,45% 2,45% 2,19% 2,19% 2272 2272
Level After simulation 3,28% 3,16% 3,17% 3,00% 11142 9909
Variation Variation 33,80% 28,80% 43,80% 37,17% 390,40% 336,14%

















Palay & corn 5197.9 -0.17 0.25 -0.14 0.27 -0.08 0.33
Fruit & vegetable 4210.7 -0.26 0.06 -0.26 0.07 -0.11 0.19
Coconut 1789.5 -0.35 0.42 -0.33 0.43 -0.57 0.23
Livestock 4473.5 -0.24 0.27 -0.29 0.22 0.1 0.55
Fishing 3996.8 -0.17 0.23 -0.19 0.2 -0.13 0.27
Other agriculture 1845.8 -0.22 0.09 -0.31 0.01 -0.62 -0.25
Logging & timber 856.5 0.19 0.82 0.07 0.71 0.14 0.77
Mining 1604.3 0.01 0.91 -0.18 0.74 -1.23 -0.14
Manufacturing 13112.5 -0.16 0.9 -0.14 0.91 -0.82 0.34
Rice manufacturing 2022.9 -0.17 0.27 -0.13 0.3 -0.07 0.36
Meat industry 2081.2 -0.12 0.55 -0.19 0.48 0.25 0.87
Food manufacturing 3696.2 -0.54 0.06 -0.49 0.1 -0.36 0.21
Electricity, gas & water 2341.3 0.06 0.85 0.1 0.88 0.15 0.93
Construction 6848.2 1.01 1.81 0.93 1.74 1.56 2.27
Commerce 15149.5 -0.18 0.66 -0.17 0.67 -0.54 0.36
Trans. & comm. 5206.4 0.07 0.79 -0.12 0.62 0.22 0.91
Finance 3580.5 0.13 0.7 0.2 0.76 -0.02 0.57
Real estate 7314.2 -0.2 0.48 -0.55 0.16 0.14 0.76
Services 6960 -0.12 0.72 0.11 0.91 -0.09 0.75
Public services 12222.8 1.86 1.87 2.2 2.15 2.33 2.26
Va              
(value 
added)
Value added tax Income tax Foreign Aid